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THE KURDS 
Charles G. MacDonald 
Florida International University 
The Middle East is wrought with the passions of bur-
geoning nationalisms, religious fervor, ethnic conflict, and exter-
nal intervention, as well as the more mundane struggle over land 
and resources. The aspirations of Pan-Arab unity and Pan-Islam 
face a subjective reality of a Middle Eastern mosaic of peoples 
artificially divided into a modern state system, with states jeal-
ously guarding their vested interests. National boundaries, al-
though tested by expansionist states pressing historical and some-
times, religious claims, are proving to be resilient, but not always 
immutable. Similarly, the nationalist aspirations of ethnic and 
religious minorities within the Middle Eastern states face the 
vested interests of their host states, which have a propensity to 
preserve the status quo and a reluctance to relinquish sovereignty 
or share power. The aspiration of national self-determination that 
emerged as a prominent milieu goal in the post-colonial world is 
often championed by the United Nations, and is repeatedly voiced 
in the Middle East. National self-determination sought by reli-
gious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East, however, is 
undermined by transnational religious movements; is too often 
the victim of the national interests of both Middle Eastern states 
and outside powers; and is repeatedly sacrificed to the exigencies 
of internal security and regional stability. 
As the Middle East moves into the 1990s, ethnic and 
religious nationalists, wedded to national liberation movements, 
appear destined to repeat their frustrations. They not on! y struggle 
among themselves and are repressed by their host states, but are 
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also manipulated by opportunistic outside parties. The tragic 
experience of the Kurdish people in the Middle East represents the 
classic example of the denial of national self-determination fol-
lowing the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish 
experience illustrates the problems faced by a "stateless nation," 1 
by "a people without a country," 2 artificially divided by state 
boundaries and otherwise separated by history. The Kurds are the 
largest national group in the Middle East without a state. 
ETHNIC IDENTITY 
The Kurdish people, an Indo-European people, are the 
fourth largest national or ethnic group in the Middle East after the 
Arabs, Turks, and Iranians, but have no state. Believed to be 
descendants of the ancient Medes, 3 Kurds today number over 
20,000,0004and primarily reside in a single parcel of land known 
as Greater Kurdistan. This Kurdish land is about 500,000-520,000 
square kilometers in area and is divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, 
Syria, and the Soviet Union. Kurds generally refer to Greater 
Kurdistan as the "the five parts" or"the five sections," rather than 
as a single entity or unified whole. 5 Additionally, Kurdish expa-
triot populations have emerged in Lebanon and in Europe, par-
ticularly in Germany and Sweden. 
Kurds historically were considered to be non-Arab nomads 
and were often thought of as being warriors or warlike. 6 However, 
they were not viewed as a separate ethnic group within the Middle 
East. Instead, they were simply seen as Moslems. The millet 
system that developed in the Middle East even before Islam and 
was adopted by the Ottoman Empire, was based upon religion. 
Nomenclature 
Today Kurds are commonly know by several names. In 
Turkey, Kurds are commonly referred to as "Mountain Turks," 
but there appears to be a growing acknowledgement of the 
Kurdish identity. Previously, reference to Turkish Kurds in Tur-
key was potentially punishable by imprisonment. In Iran Kurds 
are generally seen as an Iranian people, having many cultural 
characteristics in common with Persians, such as the important 
Now Ruz celebration . Another name associated with Kurds is 
"Pesh Merga," which refers to the Kurdish guerrillas or fighters 
and literally means "those who face death." 
Another aspect of the Kurdish identity is the relationship 
of Kurds to other minority groups found in Kurdistan. For ex-
ample, some Kurdish areas include Christians, such as Assyrians 
and Armenians, as well as Jews. It is not uncommon to see these 
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groups casually included as Kurds in Kurdish population figures. 
Moreover, the expression, "Kurdish Jews," is frequently used to 
refer to Jews from Kurdish areas. 7 ln Israel, sometimes the use of 
the word, "Kurds," refers to the Jews from Kurdish areas of Iraq, 
especially as have settled in Jerusalem. Also, some Kurdish 
nationalists have variously included Lurs and Bakhtiari as Kurds, 
even though the Lurs and Bakhtiari might disagree. The secretive 
Druze community in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel reportedly are 
sometimes linked with the Kurdish lands. 8 
Historical Developments 
Greater Kurdistan is today divided among Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union. The national (state) boundaries 
that divide Greater Kurdistan were primarily derived from the 
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The first 
division of the Kurdish region, however, dates back to the six-
teenth century clash between the Safavid or Persian Empire and 
the Ottoman Empire. The famous historical battle of Caldiran, 
August 23, 1514, served to establish probably the first division of 
the Kurdish lands, as Kurdistan became caught in the throes of 
more than a century long struggle between the two powerful 
empires. Mem .lJ. Zin, the epic work of the seventeenth century 
Kurdish poet, Ehmed-i Xani, captures the plight of the Kurdish 
peoples caught between the Ottomans and the Persians. The epic 
expresses a longing for a Kurdish king and a Kurdish kingdom, 
thus anticipating the twentieth century concept of national self-
determination by over three hundred years. 9 
The 1639 Ottoman-Persian treaty signaled the establish-
ment of a lasting partition of Kurdistan between the Ottomans 
(Turks) and the Persians. 10 It was the subsequent twentieth cen-
tury European division of the Ottoman Empire following World 
War I that contributed to a much greater fragmentation of the 
Kurdish region and to the predicament the Kurds find themselves 
today. While the promise of Kurdish self-determination did 
appear to a degree in the Treaty of Sevres after World War I, Kurds 
were initially to be offered only "local autonomy" (article 62) in 
an area that had been part of the Ottoman Empire, with the 
possibility of independence after one year only if the majority of 
the Kurdish population wanted independence and the League 
Council then recommended independence (article 64). 11 The 
Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, however, and was eventually replaced with the Lau-
sanne Treaty of January 23, 1923, primarily due to the emergent 
Turkish nationalism and the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. 
The Lausanne Treaty entirely omitted the earlier treaty's provi-
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sion for an autonomous Kurdistan 12 and dashed Kurdish hopes for 
self-determination that had been articulated so eloquently three 
centuries earlier by Ehmed-i Xani. 13 It was the boundaries based 
upon the Lausanne Treaty that divided the Kurdish people and 
resulted in separate national experiences for the Kurdish commu-
nities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Soviet Union. 
POLITICAL DEMANDS: DISPARATE NATIONAL GOALS 
The state boundaries and separate national development 
experiences of the Kurds in the five states in which Greater 
Kurdistan lies have had a significant impact on Kurdish political 
goals, and have created unsurpassable barriers to Kurdish national 
unity. The effect of the separate national experiences of the five 
Kurdish "parts" offers lessons not only for contemporary Kurdish 
nationalists, but also for other nationalist groups that find them-
selves artificially divided by state boundaries. The obstacles to 
Kurdish national unity, as evident in the twentieth century Kur-
dish experience fall into three interrelated issue areas: problems of 
communication, problems of common political action, and prob-
lems of external influence and manipulation. Problems of com-
munication and problems of common political action relate to the 
lasting effect of separate Kurdish national experiences within the 
respective host states which control the Kurdish areas and the 
ultimate parameters for pressing Kurdish political demands. The 
related problems of external influence and manipulation impact 
not only on the efficacy of obtaining national goals, but also on 
regional stability. 
Perhaps one of the key factors affecting Kurdish nation-
alism and one of the biggest obstacles to Kurdish national unifi-
cation involves the inability Kurds to communicate easily with 
Kurds in other areas. A common language is a basic common 
denominator of any national movement, and no single, recognized 
spoken or written Kurdish language has emerged, current efforts 
to systematize the Kurdish language notwithstanding. 14 The prob-
lem of communication is significant not only between Kurdish 
groups in different states, but also between Kurdish groups in 
different parts of the same state. As one scholar points out, "Of all 
the major nationalities in the Middle East, only the Kurds have yet 
to adopt a standard language, commonly accepted and learned by 
all branches of the nation." 15 
Problems in Communications 
In Iran, the Kurdish population is placed at just over 5 
million or about 9 percent of the population. 16 Kurdistan in Iran 
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lies along the Turkish-Iranian border and along the upper part of 
the Iraqi-Iranian border. Kurdistan in Iran extends well beyond 
the Kurdistan province. In addition, there is a significant Kurdish 
population in Khorasan province, dating from the 1600s. Also, 
numerous Kurds have gravitated to Tehran and other urban 
centers. 
In Iran there are two principal forms of spoken Kurdish-
Kurdi and Gorani. 17 Each has numerous dialects. The Kurdish 
dialects in the northern, central, and southeastern parts of Kurdis-
tan in Iran show varying degrees of commonality, but do present 
significant communication problems among Iranian Kurds. 18 The 
Kurdish language, being an Indo-European language, parallels 
Persian (Farsi), but is distinct from Persian even though it shares 
many common words and phrases. It also reflects significant 
Arabic influences. The study of Kurdish, however, has not been 
permitted in Iranian schools, though it is widely spoken in the 
Kurdish community. 19 In other words, while Kurdish was spoken 
in Kurdish homes, Persian was the language Kurdish children 
learned to read and write. The study of Kurdish was officially 
banned under the Shah; Kurdish schools were forbidden. Radio 
stations, however, did broadcast in Kurdish, but ofter to legitimize 
the Shah's regime. Moreover, the broadcasts asserted that Kur-
dish was a dialect of Persian. 
The Islamic Republic's constitution, as initially approved, 
provided in article 15 that the official language of Iran is Persian 
and that all official documents, correspondence, and textbooks 
must be in Persian. 20 However, the use of local and nationality 
languages would be allowed in the press and media. The teaching 
of literature in local languages, along with Persian was also to be 
permitted. 21 The original Draft Constitution provided in article 21 
that "the use of local languages in local schools and press is 
permitted," 22 but the Constitution as finally approved restricted 
the use oflocal languages to accompany Farsi and expressly stated 
that textbooks must be in Farsi. The new Constitution appeared to 
offer bilingual schools, a step away from the strict prohibition of 
the Kurdish language under the Shah. Nevertheless, practice 
remained virtually unchanged, as illustrated by the clandestine 
National Voice of Iran in January 1984. It asserted that the study 
of "English, Arabic, and other foreign languages was made 
"compulsory for the peoples of Kurdistan" and that the Islamic 
Republic had "banned or made impossible education in the 
mother tongue. "23 As one young Kurdish intellectual explained, 
"we are allowed to publish in Kurdish, but we are forbidden to 
publish in Kurdish." 
Despite the limitations on the use of Kurdish throughout 
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the Kurdish areas of Iran, the Sorani dialect has emerged as the 
predominate dialect used in radio broadcasts and in Kurdish 
publications. 24 The Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran) does radio 
broadcasts via the Voice of Kurdistan in Kurdish (and also in 
Azeri and Farsi). Komale, or the Communist Party of Iran (CPI) 
also has broadcast in Kurdish and Farsi over the Voice of the 
Revolution of Iran. While the Kurdish language is recognized as 
a national symbol, communication problems persist. Other major 
Kurdish dialects include Kurmanci in the north and northeast; 
Sinei, Kermansahi, and Leki in the south; Zaza in the north; and 
Gorani in the south, among others. 25 
In Iraq the Kurdish population is about 15-20 percent of 
the population, or possibly as high as about 3.8 million. 26 Kurds 
are situated in the mountainous northeastern part of Iraq. An 
"Autonomous Region" was established as a separate administra-
tive entity in Iraq following the March 11, 1970 Agreement and 
the Autonomy Law of 1974. However, not all Kurdish areas are 
included in the Autonomous Region. Kirkuk, for example, has a 
significant Kurdish population. 
The official language of Iraq is Arabic, but Kurdish is 
also considered to be an official language for the Autonomous 
Region. Kurds generally speak both Arabic and Kurdish in Iraq. 
The Kurdish language has flourished in Iraq since the 1958 
revolution. 27 In Iraq four main forms of Kurdish exist, but are not 
mutually intelligible. 28 Kurmanji is spoken in the north above 
Mosul, but has no literature. Sorani is spoken in the Irbil province, 
but the closely-related Sulaimani Kurdish has been considered 
"the language of Kurdish literature and the printed word." 29 
Today, Sorani (or Kurdi) has effectively become the official 
Kurdish language used in government and taught in schools. The 
fourth dialect, Gorani, is spoken by the southernmost Kurdish 
tribes, and by some of the more unusual Kurdish groups, including 
minor Islamic sects, such as the Sarlis, Kakais, and Shebeks. 30 
The Kurdish population in Turkey is difficult to assess 
because of the past Turkish Government's past aversion to view-
ing Kurds as a separate ethnic/national group. Conservative 
estimates place the Kurdish population at about 12% of the total 
Turkish population, or just over 6.8 million. 31 Other estimates 
frequently place the Kurdish population in Turkey as high as 18% 
of the total. 32 Kurds primarily live in eastern Turkey, but the 
migration of Kurds to urban areas has brought Kurds to all major 
cities. Since the Turkish Government has a history of considering 
Kurds as Turks, Kurds have generally been afforded the same 
rights as Turks, but language has been a significant problem. 
Kurds have been forced to use the Turkish language in 
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schools. Turkish, a Ural-Altaic language, is quite different from 
the Indo-European Kurdish. Moreover, since November 1928, 
Turkey has used the Latin or Roman alphabet instead of the Arabic 
alphabet. 33 The imposition of the Latin alphabet by law served to 
limit severely the ability of Turkish Kurds to read Kurdish 
materials published in Iran or Iraq. Similarly, Kurds in Iran have 
great difficulty reading Kurdish in the Latin script. Kurds in 
Turkey primarily speak the Kunnanji dialect and use the Hawar 
(Turcized Latin) characters, but the Zaza dialect is also spoken, 
such as in Dersim. 34 One Kurdish scholar, Kendal, charged that 
the Kurdish language became a target in Turkey for those want to 
destroy the Kurdish national community. 35 Under Kemalism, 
Turkey not only banned the written use of Kurdish, but also its 
spoken use, even though only a small percentage of Kurds could 
speak Turkish. In the Kurdish community, a language that one 
does not understand, is commonly considered to be "Turkish." In 
modern Turkey the 1982 Turkish Constitution continues to pro-
hibit the use of Kurdish, 36 but the Turkish Council of Ministers, 
under the chairmanship of President Turgut Ozal announced that 
it would abolish Law 2932, enacted in 1983 which bans non-
Turkish languages in Turkey. The Council of Ministers made the 
dramatic move January 26, 1991, and called for the Justice 
Ministry to prepare a new bill. 37 Such an action might eventually 
lead to the legalization of the use of Kurdish in Turkey. 
In Syria, the Kurdish population represents only about 
8%38 of the total population or about 998,675 out of 12,483,440. 39 
The Kurdish communities are primarily found in three areas. 
First, the largest Kurdish community is in northern Jazira in 
northeastern Syria near the Turkish and Iraqi border, with smaller 
concentrations in northwest Jazira and in Kurd Dagh, northwest 
of Allepo. 40 Although some speak Kurdish, most are "Arabici-
sized" and are assimilated into the local Arab culture, but not 
without some tension.41 
Kurmanji Kurdish is the primary dialect spoken in Syria, 
and Kurdish communities tend to use Hawar, the Latin alphabet 
used by the Turks. Kurdish language and cultural activities were 
the target of radical Baa th Arab nationalist pressures in the 1960s. 
The intensity of the Baath attack on the Syrian Kurds is illustrated 
by Mahamed Talab Hilal 's 1963 "Study of the Province of J azireh 
in its National, Social and Political Aspects," described by a 
leading Kurdish intellectual as "a mere invitation to genocide in 
the kind of Mein Kampf.42 The Syrian Government's harsh 
Arabization of some Kurdish areas in Syria and other anti-
Kurdish repressive acts gave way after the 1970s to more a more 
accommodating policy, especially after Saddam Hussein came 
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into power in Iraq. 
The 1989 official Soviet census places the Kurdish 
population in the Soviet Union at 153,000, but Soviet Kurds 
estimate the Kurdish population to be much greater, possibly over 
500,000. 43 Kurds historically settled in the Transcaucasus region. 
An autonomous Kurdish region, "Red Kurdistan, " existed in 
Soviet Azerbaijan from 1923 through 1929. Kurds were dispersed 
to Central Asia by Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s. Kurds now are 
found in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics as well as in 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia. 
Kurds in the Soviet Union find it difficult to communi-
cate with other Kurds because Stalin dispersed so many of them 
throughout Central Asia. The linguistic factor also comes into 
play, especially since the alphabet has complicated comprehen-
sion. In the 1920s a Kurdish alphabet that employed Armenian 
characters was developed in the Kurdish areas of the Soviet 
Union. After 1929 the Latin alphabet came to be used.45 In the 
1930s the Cyrillic alphabet was adopted and the new emphasis on 
Russian meant less opportunities in Kurdish schools. The Kurdish 
autonomous district created in Soviet Azerbaijan ceased to exist 
in 1930. It was not until the late 1950s that Soviet nationalities 
policy again fostered the use of local languages, and the Kurdish 
language reemerged. 46 Kurmanji is the predominant Kurdish 
dialect in the Soviet Union. However, Kurmanji uses Cyrillic 
script, which is not readily understood by non-Soviet Kurds. 
Problems of Common Political Action 
The lack of both a common language and common alpha-
bet represents a significant inhibitor to communication and to the 
creation of common Kurdish political goals. The inability of 
Kurds to communicate readily represents a significant barrier to 
any Kurdish national unification. This lack of effective commu-
nication, in turn, has led to Kurdish nationalists developing 
separately within theirrespective host states. The goals sought are 
not goals of Greater Kurdistan or of the Kurdish nation as a whole, 
but narrower, perceived goals linked to the separate Kurdish 
experiences and aspirations. Kurdish nationalist goals range from 
preserving the Kurdish culture and language, to autonomy or self-
rule in a larger state, to the establishment of an independent 
Kurdistan. 
The problem of goal selection, as clouded by ideology, 
religion, vested interests, and degree of assimilation in host states, 
further complicates the possibility of a common political action 
not only among Kurdish nationalists in general, but also within 
Kurdish areas of their respective host states. Moreover, the actions 
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of the host states can serve to be divisive, as Kurdish groups are 
played off against one another or co-opted to support the central 
government of the host state at the expense of Kurdish national 
goals. National liberation movements are sometimes viewed as 
having a common goals, but in disagreement on how best to 
achieve those goals. In the Kurdish case there is no common goal. 
Greater Kurdistan remains a Kurdistan of five parts. 
In Iran Kurds are one minority in a country of minorities. 
Reza Shah's efforts to enhance national unity by changing the 
name of Persia to Iran enabled the non-Persian peoples, including 
Kurds, to see themselves as Iranians. Accordingly, Kurds on the 
whole have not been excluded from individual opportunities of 
full participation within Iranian society. Many Kurds have been 
individually assimilated and have assumed prominent positions in 
the Iranian government through the years. Nevertheless, Kurdis-
tan in Iran is rural and remote and tends to be separated geographi-
cally, culturally, and politically from the Iranian central govern-
ment.47 
In Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdish goals have been primarily 
expressed from a leftist perspective, responding to class differ-
ences and, in no small way, to vested interests of tribal leaders who 
have cooperated closely with the central government over the 
years. Modem Kurdish political organization in Iran dates from 
the Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran) founded under the leadership 
of Qazi Mohammad. The Kurdish nationalist aspirations, though 
often assessed by the central government as being secessionist or 
separatist, have been generally limited to self-rule within a demo-
cratic Iran. "Democracy in Iran and Autonomy in Kurdistan" has 
been the ongoing goal of the Kurds in Iran. Even the so-called 
independent Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 48 had been calling for 
a form of autonomy within Iran. Qazi Mohammed's Kurdish 
Democratic Party (Iran) put forth an eight-point program which 
first and foremost asserted: "the Kurdish people of Iran must 
manage their own local affairs and be granted autonomy within 
Iran's frontiers." 49 Qazi Mohammad declared the "State of the 
Kurdish Republic" on January 22, 1946, but whether he was 
establishing an "autonomous regional government" or a "fully 
independent republic" was never resolved because of the fall of 
his "republic.'•So 
The Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party's goal of auton-
omy continued for decades under the leadership of the late Dr. 
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and was reflected in the slogan, 
"Autonomy in Kurdistan, democracy in Iran." The Kurdish goal 
of autonomy or self-rule in Iran has remained consistent over the 
years despite accusations of separatism. Although the goal of 
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democracy was not acceptable to the Shah orto Ayatollah Khomeini 
and the Islamic Republic, Dr. Ghassemlou remained genuine in 
his efforts to pursue autonomy within Iran. Even when Dr. 
Ghassemlou was assassinated in July 1989, he was undertaking 
secret negotiations with the Islamic Republic to repair relations 
with Tehran. 51 
In addition to the Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran), other 
Kurdish political organizations, have pushed for democracy and 
autonomy, the most notable being Komala or its follow-on 
Communist Party oflran. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party 
and Komala did not always agree on policy, cooperation has been 
significant. 52 Other leftest-oriented organizations, such as, 
Mojahedin Khalq, People's Fedayeen, and the Tudeh, have in-
cluded Kurds and have stood together with the Kurdish Demo-
cratic Party (Iran) against the forces of Zionism, imperialism, and 
reaction. 
In Kurdistan in Iran, Kurds represent a rural, underdevel-
oped, dispossessed people, who are struggling to survive. Their 
perspective, as that of many Third World peoples, is limited to 
their own isolated experience. Their isolation, together with the 
weight of their leftist ideology, has severely limited their world 
view. 
In Iraq, Kurds represent a minority associated with a 
portion of Greater Kurdistan that falls in the northern part of Iraq. 
The Kurdish experience in Iraq is fundamentally different from 
that in Iran and offers great contrasts. 53 Many Kurds have been 
fully integrated into Iraqi society and have reached the highest 
positions of power.54 Kurds participate fully in the military (unlike 
the Arab citizens in Israel). Kurdish language and education is 
allowed. Iraq's response to its Kurdish community varies consid-
erably, however. Kurdish opposition groups confronting the Iraqi 
central government, have experienced, inter alia, the horrors of 
genocide, chemical attacks, destruction of villages, and whole-
scale population transfers. Kurds were tragic victims of chemical 
attacks at Halabja on March 16, 1988, 55 and of the so-called "war 
of extermination" in the fall of 1988.56 In the past, a ruthless move 
by the central government has been followed by some form of 
amnesty, such as for military deserters or Kurdish guerrillas. 
Iraq's carrot-and-stick approach to the Kurds has enabled some 
Kurds to be co-opted and others intimidated. 
Politically, Kurds were a big loser after World War I 
when the Treaty of Sevres was replaced by the Treaty of Lau-
sanne, and legal provisions for an independent Kurdistan (after 
one year) were lost. Only after years of struggle did the Iraqi Kurds 
eventually reach an agreement with the central government in 
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Baghdad in March 1970. The Autonomy Law of 1974 that was 
subsequently negotiated supposedly was less than the Kurdish 
rebels anticipated, and the Kurdish insurrection was renewed. The 
Iraqi Kurds, however, fell victim to international political machi-
nations when Iraq signed the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran and 
outside aid (from Iran, the United States, and Israel) 57 to the Kurds 
was abruptly stopped and the border with Iran closed. The Kurds 
were trapped and defeated. Iran had agreed to prohibit Kurdish 
transborder activities and had removed the sanctuary for Iraqi 
Kurds. 
Later, the Iranian revolution so weakened the Iranian 
military's ability to police the border that Kurds again began to 
take advantage of the situation for cross border activities. Shortly 
thereafter, the Iran-Iraq War again encouraged the Kurds to seek 
their goal of "democracy in Iraq and autonomy for the Kurds" 
while the Iraqi forces were weakened. 
During and in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Kurdish Democratic Party (Iraq), under Masoud Barzani, and the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, under Jalal Talabani, entered into 
numerous national front organizations and shifting alignments 
with a variety of opposition groups seeking to overthrow the 
Baath regime in Baghdad. 58 Similarly, following the expulsion of 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait by the United States-led coalition, 
another heterogeneous grouping of anti-Saddam Hussein organi-
zations gathered in Lebanon in March 199 I. The opposition 
groups similarly called for democracy in Iraq, but not without 
significant political differences emerging between the leftist/ 
communist groups and the Islamic groups. The weakened, disor-
ganized state of the Iraqi military suggests that Saddam Hussein 
(and any post-Saddam Baathist regime) will face a renewed 
insurgency on the part of the Kurds. Any significant success on the 
part of the Kurds, could result in new political demands for an 
independent Kurdistan, contrary to the joint goals of the national 
front groupings. 
Kurds are not a recognized minority in Turkey, but 
populate much of the Eastern portion of the state, and are found in 
the urban areas. The degree of assimilation of the Sunni Kurds into 
Turkish society is debatable. Kurds have the same rights as other 
Turkish nationals, but lack recognition as an ethnic entity and are 
denied a right of national self-determination. 59 Kurds working 
within the Turkish political system reportedly can rise to promi-
nence,(,() but as Helsinki Watch points out, Turkey has also worked 
to destroy the Kurdish ethnic identity. 61 
Unlike the Kurds in Iraq and Iran who have generally 
been seeking autonomy, the leading Kurdish party in Turkey, the 
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.Kurdish Workers Party or Partia Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), 
openly advocates Kurdish independence. PKK General Secretary 
Abdallah Ocalan, the recognized head of PKK, in an interview 
with Die Zeit charged that other Kurdish leaders call for only 
autonomy to protect their feudal interests while the PKK calls for 
independence. 62 Ocalan, who founded the PKK in 1978, asserts 
that the future government and social system of a free Kurdistan 
will be decided by the Kurdish people. The PKK, however, claims 
to be Marxist-Leninist. 
Other Kurdish political groups in Turkey include, inter 
alia, the Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (SPTK), the Revo-
1 utionary Democrats (DDKD) the Kurdish Vanguard Workers 
Party (PPKK), and the National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK). 63 
The SPKT has cooperated with various other Kurdish groups, but 
has been at odds with the PKK. It envisions a workable federation 
with Turkey which the PKK does not accept. The Revolutionary 
Democrats, linked with the PPKK, clearly has Marxist leanings. 
The PPKK and the KUK is known to have cooperated with the 
SPTK. The KUK also is linked to the KDP (Iraq). The differing 
Kurdish coalitions aside, the significant difference between the 
Turkish Kurds, as reflected in the radical PKK, is the call for 
independence. 
In Syria the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority. The 
Kurdish presence dates back to the Crusades. The Kurdish people, 
however, have not been formally recognized as a national minor-
ity by the Syrian Arab Republic's 1973 Constitution. Unlike 
Armenians, who have been granted religious and cultural rights, 
Kurds are generally treated as other Moslems and tend to be 
integrated into Syrian society. The Kurdish Democratic Pary 
(Syria) was established in 1957 .64It did not seek independence or 
even autonomy for the Kurdish areas of Syria. Instead, it sought 
more mundane linguistic and cultural rights, economic support, 
and a move toward democracy. 
The relatively small and dispersed Kurdish population in 
the Soviet Union would not tend to suggest political action. 
However, in the days of Glasnost and while the Soviet Union is 
facing an uncertain future, possibly even a breakup into independ-
ent republics, Kurdish nationalism has reemerged. In July 1990, 
the first congress of Soviet Kurds was convened in Moscow. The 
congress, under the leadership of Karim Nadirov, adopted a 
resolution calling for the establishment of an autonomous region 
in Soviet Kurdistan (in Soviet Azerbaijan). 
RESOLUTION: OUTLOOK FOR POLITICAL GOALS 
In Iran the Kurdish attempt to achieve autonomy or self-
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rule was harshly put down by Ayatollah Khomeini's forces . Even 
though Iranian Kurds under Ghassemlou's leader hip attempted 
to explain publicly that they were not separatists and were not 
seeking independence, they were identified as separatists or 
traitors, and brutally defeated. The Kurds found they could not 
hold cities and could not compete with the technologically supe-
rior government forces , especially forces using air power. The 
Kurdish gains made at the beginning of the Iranian Revolution 
were quickly reversed . The Iranian Kurds were decimated. In July 
1989, when Ghassemlou, representing a greatly weakened KDP 
(Iran), was trying to negotiate with the post-Khomeini, he was 
assassinated .65 Sadiq Sharafkandi, Ghassemlou's successor con-
tinue to pursue Kurdish autonomy, but against impossible odds. 
Iraq has granted the Kurds an "autonomous region," but 
its autonomy is insufficient for many Kurdish nationalists. Kur-
dish nationalist forces have taken up arms against Baghdad 
repeatedly, but continue to face a technologically superior mili-
tary forces. The Kurds were able to control portions of Kurdistan 
in Iraq in 1974-1975 prior to having their external aid cut off 
politically via the 1975 Algiers Accord . The Kurds again moved 
to seize and control portions of the Kurdish region during the Iran-
Iraq War and in 1991 following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi 
forces. 66 In the past Iraqi Kurds have been able to control large 
areas of Iraq until the Iraqi forces resorted to sophisticated 
weaponry, such as air power and even chemical weapons . Kurdish 
nationalist aspirations in Iraq are doomed to be repeatedly de-
feated tragically , unless significant outside intervention could 
shield them from Baghdad. This is politically unlikely . Iraq will 
therefore provide Iraqi Kurds with a limited autonomy, insuffi-
cient for many nationalistic Kurds. 
The Kurds in Turkey have no possibility of achieving 
independence or autonomy in the foreseeable future. The over-
whelming power of the Turkish state will insure that the Kurds 
will be unable to hold cities . Nevertheless, Kurdish unrest might 
expand in Eastern Turkey and threaten the government's control, 
especially if Kurds receive greater freedoms in neighboring 
states. The 1991 move to legalize the Kurdish language in Turkey 
is not without significant opposition. 67 The possibility that the ban 
on the Kurdish language might be lifted appears to be the first 
positive measure for Kurdish nationalism since public order was 
established after the Sheikh Said movement. 68 Now it remains 
uncertain . 
The more modest political goals of the Kurds in Syria and 
the Soviet Union appear likely to be realized eventually. The 
Syrian Kurds appear to have an improved status in Syria, espe-
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cially after Saddam Hussein came into power in Iraq, possibly 
because they can be used as leverage. The Soviet Kurds will have 
little chance of carving a new autonomous Kurdistan out of Soviet 
Azerbaijan. The Soviet authorities have set up a commission to 
improve Kurdish conditions in the Soviet Union. Such a measured 
effort might well prove successful. 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The complexity of the Kurdish question complicates 
efforts to stabilize the region. The fact that Greater Kurdistan lies 
within five states, gives neighboring hostile states a ready made 
community to use against opposing governments. Such a Kurdish 
constituency or fifth column has been continuously manipulated 
by various states for their own national ends. Iran and Iraq have 
each supported Kurdish groups in the other. Iraq also has sup-
ported Kurdish groups in Turkey . Syria has reportedly supported 
Kurdish groups in both Turkey and Iraq . 
On several occasions there have been agreements provid-
ing for interventions to control ethnic minorities. For example, 
July 8, 1937, the Sa'dabad Pact linked Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Af-
ghanistan, especially to limit transborder activities of ethnic mi-
norities.69 Subsequently several agreements on cooperation be-
tween Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have been observed. For instance, 
Iraqi-Turkish agreement was signed in August 1981. In May 1983 
and again subsequently, Turkey invaded portions of Iraq to stop 
Kurdish activities. 70 There remains a real possibility that Turkey 
might again invade portions of northern Iraq . If the Iraqi Kurds 
would gain an enhanced autonomy or push for independence, 
Turkey would probably intervene to prevent its Kurdish popula-
tion from trying to emulate Iraqi Kurdish successes. Moreover, 
the submerged Turkish claim to Mosul might also reemerge. 
Similarly, Iraqi Kurdish success could have adestabilizingimpact 
upon Iranian Kurds and other minorities in Iran . Iran and Syria 
would both be strongly opposed to any intervention by Turkey 
into postwar lraq. 
The Kurds appear destined to lose again, unless protec-
tion of Kurdish basic human rights could be guaranteed through 
some international mandate. In such case, an enhanced Kurdish 
autonomy in Iraq might well be more desirable to that of a possible 
fragmentation of Iraq with competing international interventions. 
While Kurdish nationalism has emerged again in Iraq, it appears 
that the leftist ideology often espoused by Iraqi Kurdish organiza-
tions , might well be the greatest barrier to necessary Western 
support even though the Cold War is effectively over. The Kurds 
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will continue to face a lack of national unity caused by their 
problems of communication and historical separation, as they 
pursue their separate national goals. Their political aspirations 
appear to be impossible dreams, as the Kurds are relegated to the 
role of "stateless nations" whose interests are repeatedly sacri-
ficed for regional stability and the national interest of a number of 
host "nationless" states. 
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